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SINCE THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT THE "FACT-FINDERn, 
IT WAS OBLIGATED TO GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
The disparity between KUED's recitation of the facts of this case, as 
compared to McQuown's statement, shows that the evidence is subject to different 
interpretations. Voluminous amounts of conflicting testimony and documents 
were received in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge during the six day 
trial before the Industrial Commission. This diversity of opinion respecting the 
same evidence bolsters McQuownfs contention in this appeal, namely, that the 
district court should have given deference to the findings of the Industrial 
Commission since it was the original fact-finder, and there were two permissable 
views of the evidence. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 
L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 
A* The district court was not the fact-finder. 
Respondent mistakenly assumes that the term "fact-finder", as used in the 
cases, is synonymous with "district court". KUED cites Beehive Medical 
Electronics, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1973) for the proposition that the "district court 
findings would never be reversed unless they clearly preponderated against the 
evidence," and attempts to infer from this statement that findings of the 
Industrial Commission are not due any weight. (Respondents Brief p. 20). In 
Beehive, however, the district court made its own extensive findings of fact after 
rt had conducted a two-month trial. Because the district court acted as the trier 
of fact, the amount of deference which might be given to the previous findings of 
the Industrial Commission was not even at issue before the Supreme Court. 
Respondent confuses the role of the district court sitting as a trier of fact with its 
role as a "reviewing" court considering findings already made by a primary fact 
finder. Beehive contained "no reference to the Industrial Commission findings or 
any weight to which they were entitled," (Respondents Brief p. 20), because the 
district court was the original fact-finder. Thus, the case does not support 
KUEDfs position in this appeal. 
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B. The role of the district court is limited when reviewing a decision of an 
administrative agency. 
Respondent cites Salt Lake City v/» Lonii,.,. . i 
because it "rv-fer- i, : tie role of the district court and the weight of its findings."' 
0{esDondent,< ^r»-^ -, 20). Confer does refer tc "5> •* •!• ; 'h<- ^tr ier 
limited i irt's scope of review in v , ; , , , ^ ^ liere ;-.H> issue pertains 
to matters whicl i fall particularly within the expertise of -m -jdm mistral ivo-
agency. In such cases Confer says tl lat it is the agency's prerop • - * 
tl iese issues,, Contrary to KUEDfs assertion that the case was r«- .landec u- *r\t 
district court, it was actually remanded to the agency been. ^ " r 
determined that the agency was best si lited to resolv e the :p lestions 
Confer established "reasonableness" as the standard to apply when reviewing 
administrative decisions, Confer at p. 638. It is noteworthy that Confer cites 
Utah Dept. of Adm. Services v1 Public Service Comi nh i 
(1983), few: this standard. Respondent, on the other hnno, dit/jes ;i<i. » 
reasonableness standard of review is inapplicable to the instant case because Utah 
jDept, oi uvr . Srr/;^e> 
different *nr ^nreiat*3 i * x :.,- -.nti-Discrimination i»".' (Respondent's Brief 
p. ?2). v)nj'*'r\ ncv\^ -^ M\ v.
 w^ c i •< Anti-Discrii ninatioi i *: 
Furthermore tn:* j ' j^r* * * <nr>liecj tins mi< • n or< M - *•- u-^ 
Ma* .::- .n i\ciii v. .iiGusuiai commission, __ P 'n _ _ _ * ?i)i^.\ : : ., 
May l% 1;**.
 v - :*sse, like the instant case* '*hiMi i<d -iot IUV<--:\,H the Pnr>Ji<-» 
Service rnmmissinn. In ail'irmtn- ^ decision oi Ira* ''lduslriHl Ointmissicif 
Cour *ai-: 
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"this Court adheres to the following standard of review, 
enunciated in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, Utah, 658 P.2d 601 (1983): 
An agency's interpretation of key provisions of the 
statute it is empowered to administer is often 
inseparable from its application of the rules of law to 
the basic facts . . . In reviewing decisions such as 
these, a court should afford great deference to the 
technical expertise or more extensive experience of 
the responsible agency . . . 
The degree of deference extended to the decisions 
of the [Public Service] Commission . . . has been 
given various expression, but all are variations of the 
idea that the Commission's decisions must fall within 
the limits of reasonableness or rationality. 
Id* at 610. Thus, unless the administrative law judge's decision 
. . . is outside the limits of reasonableness or rationality, we will 
uphold it. (Kehl at p. 4-5, emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the district court below should have upheld the findings of the 
Industrial Commission unless they were outside the bounds of reasonableness. 
C« Deference must be given to the findings of the original fact-finder. 
Although Respondent did not address the Confer holding in its brief, even 
the footnote cited by KUED supports McQuown's contention that it is the fact-
finder's findings which are due deference. 
. . . As the fact finder in this equitable matter, the district 
court had the option of affirming the commission's findings, as 
was done in Beehive Medical Electronics v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah 583 P.2d 53, 55, 57 (1978), or of making its 
own findings. 
674 P.2d at 634, note 1 (emphasis added). 
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Tl lis footnote describes the power of the district court vhen i! serves as fact-
finder In tl le instant ease, the Administrative " n" " i>1^« 1 it>•*•• 11 ^w dHv nl 
testirnoi IJ fi t: i : :i fourteei 1 w iti lesses and examined nearly 1 -il) exhibits. The district 
court had the option, of conducting a complete new trial as was done in Beehive, 
It chose not to do so See Order Respecting Motion for Trial on the Record and 
Ott ler Relief", Based on the completeness of the record below, and the procedural 
fairness with which it was made, the district court decided to conduct -i Wn c -A 
-*• y:\n-M . * . .., rot.ciuci 6iuf *, • -i i i*x <ovo on the record," but in ooiny *u 
it does ;K.-I ict as ,*!*• - . ^ '"-act-finder wit! > 'v *i canine .>i cases 'ike 
ADc!?Gli±_ -ill ' ^ess<-n.cr ^ . , « . - . 
I >••'• ! "M. A TfV" precede*.; >: • «*ril* Confer and Utah I)epl» oi \.. ^ s 
V.KMI conducting *t- r^-ir- i cannot 'i^t: *• ' i n*. jnes _ .;.u Industrial 
Commission unless thev wen - • -^s . 
Respondent conceties <\^  ,., it- : -x * -- -rroneous standard is 
applicable tu ipp#«als from the decision of an original fact-finder even though the 
I Ur l\ a v ( , . i r » ^ * - i 
federal Rules ol rivil Procedure. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S.Ct. 
1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1986), cited bv RUE* or THIS point, acti lally supports 
McQuowifs eont^**:oiu UUH- -. > % • < 
given lu Uie decision** of the original finder oi iaci, ano .- re^um- -ven greater 
deference when lindings *.v » • " oeter iunatio'.s ot ihe witnesses' 
credibility. This ueierpt-- * : * •" 
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• . . only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in 
demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's 
understanding of and belief in what is said . . . But when a trial 
judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of 
one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent 
and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic 
evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can 
virtually never be clear error. [Citations omitted] Anderson, 
105 S.Ct. at 1513. 
The district court only heard McQuown, Esplin and Gregoire recite their 
educational background and a summary of their employment histories. It heard no 
testimony regarding any of the circumstances and events which led to McQuownfs 
termination from KUED. The fact that the district court entered its own written 
findings must not be given undue weight nor considered out of context. Judge 
Daniels issued his findings only because the Act seemed to require them. In 
reality, Judge Wells presided over the "trial" during which over 1,000 pages of 
testimony were reported. Judge Wells was the fact-finder. He decided which 
witnesses were most believable and which conflicting testimony was most 
plausible. Anderson demands that the reviewing court — the district court — give 
deference to Judge Wells' findings. Under Anderson, these findings could 
"virtually never be clear error." Id. 
n. 
McQUOWN^ OBJECTIONS ARE TIMELY AND HAVE NOT BEEN WAIVED. 
McQuown's objections to the district court's errors are indeed timely. 
Respondent argues that McQuown should have objected at the district court level 
to that court's failure to give deference to the Industrial Commission's findings. 
Such an objection, however, was impossible because the error was not apparent 
-6-
until after the district court had ruled. Again, the district court was acting as a 
"reviewing" court, not as a "trial" court; if a reviewing court commits error, i.e. 
applies the law incorrectly, the remedy is to appeal as has been done in this case. 
Prior to conducting its review, McQuown asked the district court to limit its 
"trial de novo" to a "review of the record" and the district court agreed. See 
Order Respecting Motion for Trial on the Record and Other Relief. Respondent 
argued for a completely new trial but the court granted McQuownfs motion over 
Respondent's objection. In seeking a "review" on the record, McQuownTs 
objective was to avoid the time, expense and staleness of a retrial, and to 
convince the district court that, under the circumstances, the Act authorized such 
a "review". McQuown never advocated that the district court abandon all 
applicable "standards of review", as KUED now seems to argue. McQuown only 
advocated that the district court "review" the administrative record with the 
deference appropriate for a "reviewing court." If the district court had applied 
Respondent's Memorandum filed August 29, 1984, argues strenuously that it 
would be unfair if the district court rendered a decision without observing the 
witnesses: 
However, petitioner submits that a limited amount of direct 
testimonial evidence is essential in this areas [sic] of the law 
relative to issues of sex discrimination, because it involves a 
determination of personal intent and even subconscious feelings 
and personalities of the parties by the finder of fact. Such 
factual issues are impossible to fairly determine without the 
presence of the key parties. It would clearly be unfair to the 
petitioner not to permit it to present for the court's observation 
the most significant witnesses, including intervenor. 
Respondent's Motion clearly acknowledges that deference must be given to the 
fact-finder who evaluates the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. It is 
puzzling that Respondent now argues against the position it took so ardently 
before the district court. 
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the proper standard of review, it would have upheld the findings of the Industrial 
Commission. 
in. 
INTENT TO DISCRIMINATE NEED NOT BE PROVED TO ESTABLISH 
A CLAIM OF AGE DISCRIMINATION. 
Respondent's contention that a successful plaintiff in an age discrimination 
suit must establish an intent to discriminate is plainly wrong. The plaintiff bears 
only the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
engaged in discriminatory practices. It is not necessary to prove that a present 
intent to discriminate existed at the time of the discriminatory practices. 14 
C.J.S. Supp. Civil Rights § 192 (1974), see also: McDonnell Douglas, supra, 
Burdine, supra, Furnco Construction v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 
L.Ed. 2d 957 (1978); Muller v. United States Steel Corporation, 509 F.2d 923 (10th 
Cir. 1975). 
A Third Circuit opinion, Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburg Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 
1393 (3rd Cir. 1984) makes clear the plaintiffs and defendant's burdens in such a 
suit. The question presented on appeal in Duffy was "whether the district court 
applied proper legal precepts in holding that a pretextual justification is 
equivalent to a finding of intentional discrimination under the ADEA." IcL at 
1394. The court held that by showing that defendant's proffered justification for 
the employment action was merely a pretext plaintiff carried the burden of 
proof. TT[U]nder the McDonnell Douglas test, a showing that a proffered 
justification is pretextual is itself equivalent to a finding that the employer 
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intentionally discriminated." Id. at 1396, citing Burdine. In Burdine, the Supreme 
Court of the United States said: 
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading 
the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. 
She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly 
by showing that the employees proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at 804-805, 93 S.Ct., at 
1825-1826. Burdine at 257 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff need not prove that age was the employer's sole or exclusive 
consideration, only that "age made a difference in the decision." Duffy at 1395. 
Aikens v. United States Postal Service, 642 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1980), also 
establishes that intent is not an element which must be proved in a discrimination 
case. KUED argues that Aikens should not apply here because the district court 
summarily dismissed the case finding "that plaintiff had failed to sustain the 
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case." (Respondent's brief at p. 31). If 
Respondent had read further, it would have discovered that the court held that 
plaintiff indeed had made out a prima facie case of discrimination because he 
should not have been required to prove that the discrimination was intentionally 
motivated. In reversing the district courtfs summary dismissal, the Circuit Court 
said: 
The second legal defect is found . . . wherein the District 
Court ruled that it was "critical" for plaintiff to offer "proof of 
discriminatory motive on the part of defendant." . . . a suit alleging 
individual discrimination does not require a showing of discriminatory 
motive. [Citations omitted! 
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KUED concedes that Judge Daniels rested his findings on a determination 
that McQuown had failed to prove an intent to discriminate (Respondent's Brief at 
p. 31-32). This burden of proof is squarely against established authority. The 
district court must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the district court was not the original fact-finder it was required to 
give deference to the Industrial Commission's findings. Those findings are due 
great deference because they were based upon Judge Wells' evaluation of 
conflicting testimonies where "variations in demeanor and tone of voice . . . bear 
so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said . . . ." 
Anderson, 105 S.Ct. at 1513. 
If the district court had applied the correct standard of review, it could not 
have reversed the findings of the Industrial Commission unless the court also 
found that such findings were beyond the bounds of reasonableness. Judge Daniels 
conceded that he merely disagreed with the previous findings even though they 
were credible. Disagreement is far from a finding of unreasonableness. The 
findings and order of the Industrial Commission must be upheld. 
It is firmly established that a successful plaintiff in an age discrimination 
suit need not prove an intent to discriminate. Inasmuch as Respondent has 
acknowledged that the district court's findings were based upon the determination 
that McQuown was required to prove intentional discrimination, the district court 
must be reversed. 
-10-
This Court should direct the entry of judgment affirming the findings and 
order of the Industrial Commission. , 
Respectfully submitted this £ ) day of November, 1985. 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK &LETA 
layiifTE. Leta, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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